Why Xi Jinping needs to visit North Korea soon

South Korean media recently reported that Chinese security and protocol personnel have arrived in Pyongyang to prepare for a visit. Chinese President Xi Jinping may travel to North Korea in late May or early June, though China has not yet confirmed the trip.

Xi last visited Pyongyang in June 2019, nearly seven years ago. Even accounting for the three years of the pandemic, that is a long delay. During the same period, Xi has visited many other countries, including South Korea. Many foreign leaders have also visited China, from Cuban and Venezuelan officials to U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks. Russia's Vladimir Putin and Vietnam's To Lam have both visited Pyongyang.

A gap in diplomatic visits sends a political message. North Korea's isolation from the world makes China-North Korea diplomacy especially significant. The two countries are communist allies, and North Korea is China's only formal treaty ally. Yet their friendship, "forged in blood," is more fragile than it appears.

Beijing has never fully accepted that North Korea now possesses nuclear weapons. This reality has become a major obstacle between the two countries. China's official policy has long been the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, nuclear weapons are North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's ultimate guarantee of regime security and his only bargaining chip to negotiate with the United States. Giving them up would mean surrendering regime security.

For Beijing, openly recognizing North Korea as a nuclear-armed state would undermine China's long-held nonproliferation position. It could also trigger pressure from South Korea, Japan, and other nations. Beijing once cooperated with the United States in pressuring Pyongyang to abandon nuclear weapons, which alienated China and North Korea. China-North Korea relations suffered for years.

In the end, Beijing had no choice but to tacitly accept North Korea's nuclear weapons. China continues to emphasize denuclearization in principle while accepting in practice that North Korea is a nuclear state. The term "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" still appears in China's diplomatic language, but it is no longer central to the relationship.

Beijing now emphasizes peace and stability on the peninsula, political settlement, opposition to U.S. military deterrence, and respect for North Korea's legitimate security concerns. This shift is significant. It shows that Beijing values the relationship with Pyongyang and now prioritizes countering U.S.-Japan-South Korea security alliances over achieving denuclearization.

A Xi visit would allow both sides to discuss a new framework. Beijing may have concluded that it can no longer allow the nuclear issue to prevent top-level exchanges with North Korea. The relationship must be reorganized based on North Korea's de facto nuclear status.

Xi's trip would also restore North Korea to China's strategic buffer zone around its borders. U.S.-Japan-South Korea security cooperation is deepening, and China-Japan relations are poor. North Korea's strategic value to China has risen. A nuclear-armed North Korea is a potential threat to China—but a much greater threat to Japan, and a useful card for Beijing.

Xi also wants to counter Russia's growing influence. Kim has moved closer to Moscow not because he wishes to replace China with Russia, but because he needs a patron willing to guarantee North Korea's security. Putin offers military and security backing. However, Russia cannot provide the complete path to economic development that China pursued in the 1980s and 1990s and that Chinese officials have long urged North Koreans to accept.

If China keeps its distance, North Korea will drift further toward Russia. Beijing may eventually lose its dominant position on the peninsula. Considering this reality, Xi's visit would aim to pull North Korea back onto a Beijing-dominated track by offering both economic and security incentives.

The visit also seeks to open access through the Tumen River and the Rajin-Sonbong economic zone. This could revitalize northeast China's economy. Northeast China was once the country's industrial heartland but has long stagnated. A shrinking population and stagnant institutions are partly to blame. However, the region's neighbors also matter. Northeast China borders North Korea, and North Korea's long closure has blocked cross-border exchanges and trade.

If China-North Korea relations improve and North Korea opens partially, the Tumen River outlet could be developed. North Korea's Rajin Port and Rason Special Economic Zone could become active again. Northeast China could gain fresh connections between the Korean Peninsula, the Russian Far East, and the Sea of Japan. During Putin's recent visit to China, the joint statement with Xi again mentioned the Tumen River and the need to consult with North Korea, showing this issue remains unresolved.

Kim Jong Un has his own reasons for welcoming Xi. He has consolidated his dynastic authority internally but needs external recognition. Putin's visit to North Korea already gave him a major security endorsement. China's significance is different. Russia is currently a major power mired in war and sanctions, with its national strength declining. China is the world's second-strongest power.

If North Korea truly wants development and regime stability, it must rely on Chinese aid and assistance. If Xi keeps delaying his visit, it signals that China-North Korea relations are not solid and that Kim's personal authority has not received Xi's full endorsement. Kim therefore needs a grand welcome for Xi to add legitimacy to his own authority.

If North Korea wants to open its doors and return to the international community in the future, it needs Beijing, not Moscow, which hovers on the edge of becoming a pariah state itself. If Kim wants to open a channel to the United States, hold another summit with Trump, and secure partial sanctions relief, he will need Beijing to mediate and provide a security guarantee.

Some observers argue that Xi's visit reflects Beijing's fear that Kim will bypass China and establish direct contact with Trump. It is possible Xi may carry a message for Trump. However, the claim that Beijing fears future U.S.-North Korea negotiations will exclude China is an exaggeration. Pyongyang will not do this, nor can it. In Kim's previous two meetings with Trump, China was not cast aside. On the contrary, Kim first met with Xi in Beijing before traveling to Singapore to meet Trump.

It is even less possible today for Kim to act alone while bypassing Beijing. North Korea does not trust the United States, and Kim does not trust Trump. The failed 2019 summit in Hanoi was a wound and a lesson for Kim. He has seen Trump's last-minute demands and sudden reversals. With the experiences of Venezuela, Iran, and perhaps Cuba before him, he will inevitably become more convinced that small countries need great-power backing, nuclear weapons, or both. How could he still trust the United States and Trump?

A Xi visit will not erase contradictions between the two sides over the nuclear issue. However, they will build a more pragmatic bilateral relationship based on reality. The two sides will continue to emphasize traditional friendship. Pyongyang will continue to need China's protection and assistance, while Beijing will continue to need North Korea as its own bargaining chip. Each side takes what it needs—and a relationship of mutual pragmatism can last a long time.